	Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP79B01709 03500030031-8				
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		COMOR-D-47/8			
		5 October 1961			
	MEMORANDUM FOR:	Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance			
	SUBJECT:	Views of the United States Intelligence Board on Resumption of U-2 Overflights of the USSR			
		1. Attached for the information of the members of the United States Intelligence Board and COMCR is a copy of the conclusions referred by the USIB to the Special Group at its meeting on 5 October 1961. It was forwarded this afternoon to the Special Group Officer.			
	clusions referred by the 5 October 1961. It was fo	US)B to the Special Group at its meeting on			
	clusions referred by the 5 October 1961. It was for Officer.	US)B to the Special Group at its meeting on			
	clusions referred by the 5 October 1961. It was for Officer.  2. This paper	US)B to the Special Group at its meeting on orwarded this afternoon to the Special Group			
	clusions referred by the 5 October 1961. It was for Officer.  2. This paper	US)B to the Special Group at its meeting on arwarded this afternoon to the Special Group was the result of the USIB consideration  Chairman			
	clusions referred by the 5 October 1961. It was for Officer.  2. This paper	US)B to the Special Group at its meeting on arwarded this afternoon to the Special Group was the result of the USIB consideration  Chairman  Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance			
	clusions referred by the 5 October 1951. It was for Officer.  7. This paper of COMDR-D-47/7.	US)B to the Special Group at its meeting on arwarded this afternoon to the Special Group was the result of the USIB consideration  Chairman  Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance			

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COMOR-D-47/8

## 5 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Special Group

SUBJECT:

Views of the United States Intelligence Board on Resumption of U-2 Overflights

of the USSR

- The USIB has considered the intelligence which could be obtained through a limited number of U-2 flights (say 3 or 4) directed at the highest priority targets bearing on the USSR missile capability to attack the U. S. and its Allies. The information, if obtained, would certainly refine our estimates and increase the confidence in our assessment of the current threat. In particular, it would provide information on the operational characteristics and readiness of these Soviet weapons systems.
- Z. We are mindful of the operational and political risks involved in such an undertaking. Our assessment of the intelligence which might be obtained, in the light of our appreciation of the political and operational factors involved, does not justify our urging U-2 flights over the USSR at this time.
- 3. We note that most of our major highest priority targets are located in the northern area of the USSR. The sun angle during

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several months after late November will make useful photography impossible to obtain in the far north and difficult to obtain in the remainder of this area. Overflights of most of the critical targets would be feasible this year only between now and late November.

Copy 1-7 Special Group

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8--AC/DPD

19--DDI(P) TCO
20--OCI TCO
21--OSI TCO
22--ORR TCO
23--DIR NPIC
24--TSO CIA
25--C/DMD/NPIC
26--PAD/NPIC
27--DDP TCO
28--Intel/DPD
29--SO/DPD
31-34--C/SRS/DPD/DDP
30--Liaison Officer/NPIC

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